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Abstract 
Since the onset of the Great Recession, “doing more with less” has become a policy 
mantra. To do more with less, a range of governments have concurrently imposed 
wage cuts and greater work demands on public employees. This article assesses the 
impact of these changes on the job satisfaction and work motivation of public 
employees in 34 European countries. Congruent with previous studies linking income 
and working hours with job attitudes, it finds a negative impact on both. There are 
thus no free austerity lunches: while public employees may work longer hours at 
lower pay, they are less satisfied and less motivated when doing so. One caveat 
applies. The effect on motivation – albeit not satisfaction – is mitigated when 
employees feel their values are aligned with those of their organizations. This puts a 
premium on public managers fostering value alignment, particularly when it is hardest 
to achieve: in times of cutbacks. 
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Introduction 
In the last decade, public organizations across the globe have been put under stress by 
increasingly demanding work environments. This trend is driven by the concurrence 
of austerity measures and greater citizen demands for quality public services 
(Karanikolos et al. 2013: Raudla et al. 2015). In other words, since the Great 
Recession, public employees have been asked to do more with less. This trend 
continues unabated in many countries, with ongoing spending cuts in public sectors 
from Brazil to Greece to several U.S. states, to name just a few. As a result, delivering 
improved services through a motivated workforce has become “one of the main 
challenges for the public sector in the developed world” (Leslie and Canwell 2010, 
297). Concurrently, the relationship between austerity, enhanced work demands and 
organizational behavior has become of central importance to public sector 
governance. 
Yet, this relationship remains underexplored in the post Great-Recession period. This 
is even though austerity and cutbacks have been rediscovered as a research topic by 
public management scholars since the onset of the financial and economic crises in 
2008 (see, among many, Bozeman 2010; Pandey 2010; Lodge and Hood 2012). These 
studies build on earlier, seminal work on public management challenges during 
recessions (Levine 1979). A subset of these studies has hinted qualitatively at 
potential adverse impacts of “salami slicing” and other cutback strategies on 
bureaucratic behavior and attitudes (Hood 2010). Cutbacks are, to cite just one 
mechanism, argued to undermine the social contract in public organizations – which 
is partially based on predictability in benefits and pay. As such, they are argued to 
“pose a direct challenge to employee motivation” (Pandey 2010, 567). Practitioners 
echo this concern, fearing a “negative impact on the morale of staff” (OECD 2012, 
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36). At the same time, however, from an empirical perspective the “effects of salary 
cutbacks and freezes on staff motivation are not clear” (OECD 2012, 37). 
This is an important omission. Great Recession and post-Great Recession cutbacks 
across the globe can be expected to shape public employees’ attitudes and behavior: 
they directly affect livelihoods and work lives of public employees. Cutbacks tend to 
do so as because “the public wage bill is typically a major target during fiscal 
consolidations,” as, “especially during crises, many other expenditure items are 
difficult to cut quickly” (Forni and Novta 2014, 3). In fact, 20 OECD member 
countries imposed wage cuts in the public sector since 2009; and an additional 15 
countries implemented staff reduction programs (OECD 2012). Arguably, it seems 
that public employees are thus paid less to do more with less staff. 
Whether they, in fact, do more with less while being paid less remains in part unclear, 
however. To our knowledge, four studies have assessed the impact of post-2009 
cutbacks on work-related attitudes, well-being and behavior of public sector staff 
(Conway et al. 2014; Kiefer et al. 2015; van der Voet and Van de Walle 2015; van der 
Voet and Vermeeren 2016). Except for van der Voet and Van de Walle, (2015) who 
do not identify significant average effects, they associate cutbacks with lower job 
satisfaction, employee well-being, organizational commitment and citizenship 
behavior. 
While these results are a helpful starting point for the present article, they paint an 
incomplete picture of the effects of Great Recession and post-Great Recession 
austerity measures in public sectors. None of the studies assesses the effect of salary 
changes on bureaucratic attitudes and behavior – even though wage cuts have 
constituted the most widespread cutback since 2009 (OECD 2012). All focus 
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exclusively or largely on public managers – rather than lower-level employees who 
are typically the target of cutbacks. And none has focused explicitly on work 
motivation – despite its centrality in achieving more with less. 
This article fills these lacunae by answering a central research question in austerity 
governance: what are the net effects of wage cuts and enhanced work demands on 
work motivation and job satisfaction of public employees?  We address this question 
for 34 European countries –thus shedding the most comprehensive empirical light on 
the effects of the Great Recession in public sectors to-date. 
 
Literature and theory 
Job satisfaction and work motivation have been a staple of scholarly research on the 
public sector. An exhaustive review would exceed the scope of this article. Job 
satisfaction in the public sector alone, for instance, has seen at least 99 studies that 
identified 43 potential correlates (Cantarelli, Belardinelli, and Belle 2015). Hence, our 
ambition is more modest: to review studies shedding theoretical or empirical light on 
the effects of two key variables in austerity governance – income and working hours – 
on, first, job satisfaction and, second, work motivation. Subsequently, we will 
consider how values and value alignment may shape these effects.  
In the case of job satisfaction, a significant body of literature argues that income and 
working hours are strong predictors of job satisfaction (Nanda and Browne 1977; 
Clark and Oswald 1996; Baltes et al. 1999; Judge et al. 2010). Both social exchange 
theory and job demands-resources theory provide theoretical rationales for this 
finding.  
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According to social exchange theory, employees evaluate the fairness of their 
working conditions by “comparing their own ratio of inputs (e.g., effort and skill) and 
outcomes (pay, recognition) to the input-outcome ratios of important ‘comparison 
others’ such as close coworkers, workers in other companies, or the employee's past 
work history” (Rynes, Gerhart, and Minette 2004, 388). Consequently, where 
employees compare their current situation – lower pay and/or longer working hours – 
with their own past in times of cutbacks, their notion of equity is violated. Rousseau 
(2001) states that this violation in turn constitutes a breach of contract between the 
employee and the organization. Rousseau’s theory – which derives from social 
exchange theory –  is based on the notion of an unwritten agreement (a psychological 
contract) between employees and their organization: employees expect to perform 
certain tasks to obtain certain rewards. Greater predictability of pay and benefits in 
the public sector, arguably, enhance the perceived strength and importance of this 
contract in the case of public employees. Cutbacks thus breach both this 
psychological contract and employee notions of equity. Consequently, employee 
satisfaction with their jobs declines. 
Job-demands theory provides an alternative theoretical account to explain the 
negative relationship between cutbacks and job satisfaction (Bakker and Demerouti 
2007). Cutbacks concurrently enhance work demands and decrease the amount of 
resources employees can rely on in their work. They may thus exhaust employees’ 
mental and physical resources, resulting in decreased job engagement and 
satisfaction. 
Theoretically, we may thus expect a significant negative relationship between worse 
working conditions and job satisfaction. Empirically, the relationship between income 
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and working hours and job satisfaction has been recurrently explored. In the public 
sector, a recent meta-analysis has identified sixteen studies linking income with job 
satisfaction, yielding on average a moderate positive correlation between the two. 
Similarly, fewer work demands are positively and moderately correlated with job 
satisfaction, albeit with a smaller number of studies and observations supporting this 
inference (Cantarelli, Belardinelli, and Belle 2015). The select prior research more 
specifically focused on the attitudinal effects of the Great Recession in the public 
sector is, as noted in the introduction, largely congruent with this prediction: it 
associates cutbacks with lower job satisfaction (Conway et al. 2014; Kiefer et al. 
2015; van der Voet and Vermeeren 2016). With the findings of these studies in mind, 
it is plausible to hypothesize that wage cuts and enhanced work demands on public 
employees in Europe – in short worse working conditions – impact their attitudes 
towards their jobs and, in particular, job satisfaction in the following way (H1):  
Hypothesis 1: Worse working conditions contribute to lower levels of job 
satisfaction of public employees. 
Next to job satisfaction, prior studies point to a plausible effect of working conditions 
on work motivation. We understand work motivation here as an inner force that 
drives individuals to accomplish specific tasks that are believed to have a positive 
effect towards the organization’s performance (Perry and Porter 1982). Thus, it gives 
individuals’ behavior purpose, persistence and direction. 
In the general management literature, salary changes and working overtime have been 
found to be strong predictors of work motivation (Beckers et al. 2004; Frey 1997; 
Rynes, Gerhart, and Minette 2004). When companies cut salaries of employees and 
ask them to keep working the same number of hours, their motivation diminishes. As 
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with job satisfaction, social exchange – and its derivative psychological contract – 
theory provides a theoretical rationale for this negative effect of (worse) working 
conditions on motivation. As noted above, cutbacks breach both the employees’ 
psychological contract with their employer and employee notions of equity, including 
by reducing advancement opportunities, compensation and job security. In response 
to reduced efforts from the organization, employees reduce their contributions to the 
organization – and thus rebalance the exchange relationship – by decreasing their 
effort and investment toward the organization (Lavelle, Rupp, and Brockner 2007).  
Whether this theoretical prediction does lead to lower motivation of employees in 
public sector contexts remains empirically scarcely tested, however. Public service 
motivation (PSM) has been extensively researched (Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise 
2010). For our purposes, however, PSM is of limited use. It is a more circumscribed 
concept, referring to motives that drive individuals to help society and its citizens 
(Kim and Vandenabeele 2010; Perry and Wise 1990) – rather than a broader 
motivation to accomplish tasks that are perceived to benefit an organization’s 
performance. 
Similarly, in regards to the effect of pay, the relationship between pay-for-
performance on public employee motivation has seen ample studies; a recent meta-
analysis includes 46 such studies (Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh 2010). Yet, the effect of 
pay cuts and increases in working hours on work motivation is much less well-
explored. Resource reductions have been associated with lower morale in the public 
sector qualitatively, but not quantitatively (Levine 1979; Kiefer et al. 2015; Lindorff, 
Worral, and Cooper 2011). Our study improves upon this limited quantitative 
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evidence basis, testing whether the motivation of public employees asked to earn less 
and/or work longer hours for the same salary decreases (H2). 
Hypothesis 2: Worse working conditions contribute to lower levels of work 
motivation of public employees. 
Salary cuts and increased working hours are not the only determinants of job attitudes 
such as job satisfaction or work motivation. Other variables are also at play. 
Importantly, these variables may mediate the effect of working conditions on job 
attitudes. To illustrate, in the post-2008 austerity context, van der Voet and Van de 
Walle (2015) identify a mediating role for autonomy when it comes to explaining job 
satisfaction. Our article accounts for this empirically and goes further from a 
theoretical point of view. It, additionally, considers the role of value alignment in job 
satisfaction and work motivation in the post-2008 austerity context. 
As context for this discussion, note that values may be understood as “a broad 
tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others” (Hofstede 1980, 19). Attitudes, 
by contrast, are “a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or 
situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner” (Rokeach 1968, 
112). The two are related but distinct: in Homer and Kahle’s (1988) terms, values 
predict attitudes and attitudes predict behaviors.  Drawing on job-demands and 
psychological contract theory, we argue that value alignment moderates the effect of 
working conditions on job satisfaction and work motivation.  
Several prior studies of the determinants of job satisfaction have shown that the 
congruence between an individual’s personal values and those reflected in the 
organization and individual’s job is a significant predictor of job satisfaction (see, 
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among others, Kirkman and Shapiro 2001). Extrapolating from job-demands theory 
provides a theoretical rationale for, additionally, expecting value alignment to 
moderate the effect of austerity-induced cutbacks on job satisfaction (H3). If 
employees develop job tasks that reflect – and enable them in their workplace to live 
by – their personal values, worse working conditions are less likely to exhaust 
employees’ mental and physical resources, and thus decrease their job satisfaction. 
Empirically, H3 builds on prior studies which have found that value alignment does 
moderate the effect of worse working conditions on a related concept: employee 
wellbeing (Schaufeli 2015; Leiter, Frank, and Matheson 2009).  
Hypothesis 3: Value alignment will moderate the negative effects of worse 
working conditions on job satisfaction. 
A similar moderating effect may be expected in the case of work motivation. 
Motivation can be understood as an assumed mental program that is associated with 
both attitudes and values (Hofstede 1980) – or, in motivation terminology, 
expectancies and valances (see Vroom 1964). In fact, empirically, values – next to 
core personality traits and attitudes – have been identified as key antecedents of work 
motivation (van Witteloostuijn, Esteve, and Boyne 2017). Congruently, value 
alignment has been found to be a central predictor of performance – and motivation – 
of employees and organizations (Brown 1976; Paarlberg and Perry 2007). In contrast, 
requests to act against what an employee “knows to be right” are major sources of 
conflict within organizations.  Empirical implications of value alignment then include, 
for instance, employees working harder if they believe in the mission of the 
organization (Wright 2007).  
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Extrapolating from psychological contract theory, we hypothesize that value 
alignment not only enhances employee work motivation, but also moderates the 
effects of working conditions. If employee values are aligned with those of the 
organization, the pursuit of organizational values – rather than pay and shorter 
working hours – becomes relatively more important in employees’ psychological 
contracts with public organizations. As such, a change in organizational values rather 
than pay and working hours may constitute the major breach of contract for 
employees. At high levels of value alignment, worse working conditions may thus 
impair work motivation relatively less. This leads us to hypothesize (H4): 
Hypothesis 4: Value alignment will moderate the negative effects of worse 
working conditions on work motivation. 
If H3 and H4 were to be true, this would light a small beacon of hope for ‘doing more 
with less’ advocates. Public managers could salvage the job satisfaction and work 
motivation of their employees by ensuring high value alignment. At the same time, it 
would refine the scholarly understanding of job satisfaction and work motivation of 
public employees in times of austerity.  
Data and Methods 
The data for hypothesis testing is drawn from the fifth edition of the European 
Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS), conducted in 2010. In this edition, workers 
were surveyed in the EU28 plus Macedonia, Turkey, Norway, Albania, Kosovo, and 
Montenegro. The survey was implemented via face-to-face interviews by Gallup 
Europe and its network of national institutes (Gallup Europe, 2010). Interviews were 
conducted at the home of the interviewee and in the national language(s) of the 
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country. Several duties of care enhance confidence in validity. Experts of Eurofound’s 
European Working Conditions Observatory reviewed the quality of the translated 
questionnaires; interviewers did not carry out more than 20 interviews each, to 
mitigate possible biases from interviewer effects; and interviewers participated in 
detailed briefings developed by the national institutes of Gallup Europe. 
Sample 
The sample was selected by a multi-stage, stratified, random approach. A primary 
sampling unit was drawn randomly for each region of the 34 countries by considering 
the degree of urbanization. Secondly, a random sample of households was drawn in 
each primary sampling unit. Finally, the worker chosen in each household was the one 
who had his or her birthday next. Therefore, only one interview was conducted in 
each household. As Daniels (2004) writes, this sampling method produces samples 
representative of the wider working population (see also Paoli and Merllié 2001). 
Each participant country interviewed at least 1,000 employees (see Gallup Europe 
2010 for the overall number of responses per country). Participants needed on average 
42 minutes to complete the questionnaire. In total 43,816 employees were surveyed, 
at a response rate of 44.2%. To classify respondents, the questionnaire asked each 
participant to select one of the following options: private sector; public sector; joint 
public-private organization or company; not-for-profit sector, NGO; Other (define), 
Do not know; and finally, refusal to answer the question. This article focuses on the 
9,761 employees (i.e. excluding managers) who work in the public sector.1 The final 
sample contains employees from several sectors: central public administration (22%), 
education (29%) and health (20%).  
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Dependent Variables 
The two dependent variables (i.e. job satisfaction and motivation) are based on a 
single item question. Job satisfaction is measured on a 4-point Likert scale with the 
question “On the whole, are you very satisfied, satisfied, not very satisfied or not at 
all satisfied with working conditions in your main paid job?” This type of single-item 
overall job satisfaction measure has been shown to be equally reliable and valid as 
multiple-item measures (Dolbier et al. 2004; Nagy 2002; Wanous, Reichers, and 
Hudy 1997). Work motivation is measured on a 5-point Likert scale with the question 
“The organization I work for motivates me to give my best job performance.” Work 
motivation is thus understood in its broader sense as a force that drives individuals to 
accomplish personal and organizational goals. 
Our two dependent variables are related but distinct concepts. Prior research suggests 
that they can mutually affect each other, but may still be present without the 
respective other (Furnham, 1992; Furnham et al. 2009). As such, it is important to 
study them as separate dependent variables. Our study is empirically congruent with 
this assertion: our two dependent variables are significantly, albeit not highly 
correlated (r=0.38). 
Explanatory Variables 
The key explanatory variables in the survey are questions querying about changes in 
income and working hours:  
 “If you compare your current situation with that of January 2009, have you 
experienced a change in your salary or income?”  
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 “If you compare your current situation with that of January 2009, have you 
experienced a change in the number of hours you work per week?” 
They are measured on a 1-3 scale (1=Decrease; 2=No change; 3=Increase). Note that 
the period of change measured – 2009-2010 – coincides with the onset of austerity in 
a range of countries. In 2009-2010, 14 OECD countries sought fiscal consolidation 
measures (OECD 2012). To illustrate, these ranged from reduced base pay (e.g. 
Slovenia) to cuts in bonuses and allowances (e.g. Greece) to increased working hours 
(e.g. Spain and Portugal), among others (Forni and Novta 2014; OECD 2012).  
By drawing on the 2010 survey, our study underestimates the effects of the Great 
Recession on public employees’ job attitudes and behavior. The effects of further – 
and more severe – fiscal retrenchment in 2011-2013 are not considered (Di Mascio 
and Natalini 2015). Note, however, that as a result the study’s estimates are biased 
against our hypotheses. If the less severe austerity measures in 2009-2010 are found 
to influence public employees, we can expect more severe subsequent measures to 
affect public employees even more significantly. The empirical analysis below thus 
represents a particularly challenging – and robust – test of our hypotheses. 
To estimate the behavioral effects of ‘doing more with less’, we aggregate the two 
questions about salaries and working hours into a single measure that captures 
austerity-induced changes in working conditions. This concept is measured on a scale 
ranging from 1 (working conditions have worsened) to 5 (working conditions have 
improved). More specifically, 1 indicates an increase in working hours and wage cut; 
2 is an increase in working hours and no salary change, or no change in working 
hours and a pay cut; 3 indicates no change in either working hours or salary; 4 implies 
a decrease in working hours and no salary change, or no change in working hours and 
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a salary increase; finally, 5 indicates a decrease in working hours and increase in 
salary. Note that, as a measure of retrospective reporting of pay and working hour 
changes by respondents, the measure is at risk of not reflecting real changes in 
working conditions. To rule out this possibility and validate the measure, we 
correlated country averages of reported public sector salary changes in the survey 
with real changes in the average remuneration of public administration officials from 
2009 to 2010 according to Eurostat data for 26 countries (Eurostat 2016). The two are 
statistically significantly correlated (r=0.745). This suggests that our key independent 
variable measure does tap into real changes in working conditions in European public 
sectors. Note also that our key independent variable taps into changes in working 
conditions across the sectors included in the sample: there are no statistically 
significant differences in changes in working conditions between public employees in 
administrative, health and education sectors. 
Our key moderating variable – value alignment – in turn is measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale with the survey question: “Your job involves tasks that are in conflict 
with your personal values.” This measure has been adapted from Schaufeli (2015) and 
assesses the interplay between the values of the individual and the organization’s 
value system (Liedtka 1989). In addition, we consider 11 control variables related to 
individual characteristics and organizational behavior (see Appendix for 
corresponding survey questions). These duplicate the most common correlates of 
work motivation and job satisfaction in prior studies (Bright 2008; Chalofsky 2003; 
Michaelson 2005; Kirkman and Shapiro 2001; Rynes, Gerhart, and Minette 2004; 
Steijn 2008; Wright and Pandey 2008; Xiao and Jintae Froese 2012). They include: 
gender, age, education, income, working hours, size of workplace, tenure, work 
pressure, autonomy, organizational involvement, feeling of work well done and useful 
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work. Note that, with the inclusion of levels of income and working hours among 
controls, the study also ensures that our key explanatory variables are capturing 
changes in these variables since 2009 while keeping levels constant. 
Since the present study relies on perceptual measures for the two dependent variables 
and some of the explanatory variables from the same respondent, common method 
bias may occur (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). To reduce the likelihood that 
respondents “edit their responses to be more socially desirable, lenient, acquiescent, 
and consistent with how they think the researcher wants them to respond” (Podsakoff 
et al. 2003, 888), respondent anonymity was guaranteed. In addition, the questions 
pertaining to the predictors and criterion variables were segmented into different 
sections of the survey as recommended by Podsakoff et al (2003). Thus, while 
common-method bias cannot be ruled out, the aforementioned duties of care suggest 
that it is not a significant problem in the context of this research. 
Results 
In order to test the hypotheses, we conduct six hierarchical linear regression models, 
three for each of our two dependent variables: job satisfaction and work motivation. 
This is an appropriate approach given the two-level hierarchical nature of our data, 
which groups individuals (level 1) into countries (level 2). Thus, in this analysis we 
recognize that public sector employees within a particular country may be more 
similar to one another than employees in other countries (Hofmann 1997). In this 
vein, hierarchical linear regression models overcome the problem of independent 
observations derived from our large-N cross-European sample (Osborne 2000). 
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays the binary correlation table. Note that there are no multicollinearity 
problems biasing the results (Bowerman and O’Connell 1990; Menard 1995). The 
correlations between the control and explanatory variables are low to moderate. In 
addition, the average coefficient of the variance inflation factors (VIF) used to assess 
multicollinearity is 1.20 and all the factors are below 2. 
[Table 1 here] 
Analysis 
We now turn to presenting the results of the hierarchical linear models for job 
satisfaction (table 2) and work motivation (table 3) respectively. In each of the tables, 
Model 1 includes only the control variables.  Model 2 adds our main explanatory 
variable (working conditions). Model 3 considers the hypothesized interaction effect 
between working conditions and value alignment.  
Comparing differences in the log likelihood between Model 1 and Model 2 suggests 
that changing working conditions after 2009 are a powerful explanatory factor for 
both job satisfaction and motivation. In the case of job satisfaction, the log likelihood 
is reduced from 3,723 to 3,097 (table 2); in the case of work motivation, the log 
likelihood decreases from 5,204 to 4,359 (table 3). In both cases, the overall fit of the 
hierarchical linear models is statistically significantly improved by adding working 
conditions as an explanatory variable.  
[Table 2 here] 
[Table 3 here] 
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Significance extends not only to our three models but also the causal effects of 
changing working conditions. As illustrated in table 2, deteriorations in working 
conditions in 2009-2010 are associated with significantly lower job satisfaction of 
employees (βchange in working conditions = .118, S.E. = .016, p < .001) (model 2). This 
finding provides empirical support for our first hypothesis. 
Deteriorations in working conditions, similarly, exerted a significant effect on work 
motivation (table 3). They are associated with significantly lower work motivation 
(βchange in working conditions = .113, S.E. = .024, p < .001), confirming hypotheses 2 (model 
2). Salary cuts and greater work demands thus diminished motivation levels of 
employees in 2009-2010. 
Turning to the moderating effect of value alignment, we find – contrary to our third 
hypothesis – no significant interaction effect between value alignment and working 
conditions (model 3). In other words, the negative effect of worse working conditions 
on job satisfaction is not moderated when employees’ personal values are aligned 
with organizations. Our expectation that value alignment moderates employee 
exhaustion with worse working conditions – and thus part of their negative effect on 
job satisfaction – is thus not confirmed. As a caveat, note, however, that 
multicollinearity puts a premium on caution in interpreting the insignificance of this 
interaction. The interaction term is significantly correlated with changes in working 
conditions (0.66). With its addition, the mean VIF increases to 5,25, with high VIFs 
for the interaction effect (29.19), value alignment (16.18) and changes in working 
conditions (14.85). Multicollinearity between these three variables may thus detract 
from statistical significance. 
18 
Contrary to the case of job satisfaction, value alignment does moderate the effect of 
working conditions in the case of work motivation (model 3). The interaction effect is 
significant at the 5%-level. This suggests that, if employees perceive that their 
personal values are aligned with their jobs, the effects of negative working conditions 
on motivation are attenuated. 
Adding confidence in the validity of estimates, the remaining control variables are 
largely congruent with most prior studies (cf. Cantarelli, Belardinelli, and Belle 2015; 
Cameron, Banko, and Pierce 2001). First, job characteristics matter for both job 
satisfaction and work motivation. Our results thus confirm previous research showing 
the effects of organizational involvement on the motivation and job satisfaction of 
public employees (Brooke, et al., 1988; Brown, 1996). In addition, more autonomy 
among employees, higher levels of organizational involvement, having the feeling of 
doing work well done, doing useful work, and having values that are aligned with the 
organization are positively and significantly related at the 5% level or above to both 
job satisfaction and motivation. Second, greater work pressure impairs job satisfaction 
– albeit not motivation (p < .01). When employees have to work at high speed and 
under tight deadlines, they are less satisfied with – yet equally motivated to do – their 
jobs. Third, demographic characteristics matter, although differentially for job 
satisfaction and work motivation. The older an employee gets, the less satisfied – yet 
not less motivated – they will be with their job (p < .05). At the same time, women 
are associated with higher work motivation than men, yet not more job satisfaction (p 
< .01). 
Disaggregating this analysis into distinct European regions enables us to add further 
evidence in favor of our main hypotheses. Prior research based on the Coordinating 
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for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS) survey identified a strong 
public sector North-South divide in post-2009 Europe (see, Hammerschmid et al 
2016; Greve, Lægreid and Rykkja 2016). When testing for differences between the 
effect of our key independent variable – changes in working conditions – on work 
motivation and job satisfaction across Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western 
Europe, we find a similar divide. In Southern Europe, the effect of changes in 
working conditions on job satisfaction is significantly larger than in the remainder of 
Europe. In Northern Europe, the effect of changes in working conditions on job 
satisfaction is significantly smaller – and, in fact, not statistically different from zero 
(see tables A1 to A4 in the Appendix). We find no significant differences between 
Western and Eastern Europe and the European average. These results suggest that our 
findings may not extend to Northern Europe. At the same time, the congruence of this 
North-South divide with prior research adds further confidence in the validity of our 
overall results.  
Robustness Checks 
Several robustness checks lend further credence to our findings. First, we find that 
moderators identified in prior studies – autonomy and job insecurity – do not detract 
from the significance of most of our findings. Van der Voet and Van de Walle (2015) 
argue that autonomy moderates the relationship between cutback measures and job 
satisfaction. We find empirical support for this assertion for job satisfaction. At the 
same time, autonomy is – contrary to value alignment – not a significant moderator 
for work motivation (see table A5 in the Online Appendix). Conway et al. (2014) in 
turn argue that job security should be taken into account as a moderator for the effect 
of worse working conditions. We control for this, but do not find empirical support 
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for this assertion. Our core results remain significant with either of these additional 
interactions (see table A6 in the Online Appendix). 
Second, we included level-2 variables to account for the fact that some countries were 
more affected by the recession than others. Our level-1 variables – on changes in pay 
and working hours in the public sector – of course reflect part of the cross-country 
variation in recessions. Beyond their impact on public sector working conditions, 
however, recessions can affect publics sector work motivation and job satisfaction 
through other mechanisms, for instance by curtailing the attractiveness of private 
sector employment. We thus re-ran all models with a recession proxy as a level-2 
variable: 2009-2010 changes in per capita incomes. Our results remain robust to this 
specification (see table A7 in the Online Appendix). 
Discussion 
In sum, the results provide strong confirmatory evidence for a negative effect of pay 
cuts and longer working hours in 2009-2010 on both job satisfaction and work 
motivation. There are thus no free austerity lunches: while public employees in 
Europe may work longer hours at lower pay, they are less satisfied and less motivated 
to perform for their organizations when doing so.  
The effect on job satisfaction is congruent with both job-demands theory – worse 
working conditions exhaust employees and thus decrease their satisfaction – and 
psychological contract theory – cutbacks are perceived as breaches of contract which 
curb employee satisfaction (Bakker and Demerouti 2007; Rousseau 2001). The effect 
also provides further confirmatory evidence for a range of prior studies of job 
satisfaction (see Cantarelli, Belardinelli, and Belle 2015). Notwithstanding the lesser 
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importance public employees place on economic rewards (De Graaf and van der Wal 
2008), their job satisfaction thus falls when working conditions deteriorate.  
The effect we identified on work motivation in turn adds important empirical 
evidence to the, so far, scarce studies associating resource reductions in the public 
sector with lower motivation (Levine 1979; Kiefer et al. 2015; Lindorff, Worral, and 
Cooper 2011). The finding is, furthermore, compatible with social exchange and 
psychological contract theory (Lavelle, Rupp, and Brockner 2007; Rousseau 2001). 
Public employees in Europe appear to respond to reduced perceived effort from their 
organizations towards them in times of austerity – a contract breach – with decreases 
in their own work motivation. 
The results, however, do point to one cautious reason for hope: the effect of worse 
working conditions on work motivation was moderated by value alignment. Greater 
value alignment thus shielded the work motivation – albeit not job satisfaction – of 
public employees during pay cuts and greater work demands. This confirms the 
theoretical expectation derived from psychological contract theory (Rousseau 2001). 
With value alignment, the pursuit of organizational values – rather than pay and 
shorter working hours – becomes more important in psychological contracts. Worse 
working conditions thus come to constitute a lesser breach of contract. Value 
alignment is thus not only a significant positive contributor to bureaucratic behavior 
in its own right, as prior studies had emphasized (Paarlberg and Perry 2007; Grant 
2008; Wright 2007), but can also act as an important moderator of deteriorations in 
other determinants of bureaucratic behavior and attitudes. 
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The policy implication is clear: public sector leaders should put a premium on 
measures to strengthen value alignment particularly when it is arguably hardest to 
achieve: in times of cutbacks. 
Conclusion 
Our study offers significant contributions to the scholarly understanding of both 
austerity governance and bureaucratic job attitudes. First, it provides the most large-
scale empirical evidence to-date on the effects that austerity measures imposed since 
2009 had among European public sector employees. It finds that pay cuts and longer 
working hours dampened both job satisfaction and work motivation. This is congruent 
with a range of pre-Great Recession studies linking income and working hours with 
job attitudes (Baltes et al. 1999; Cantarelli, Belardinelli, and Belle 2015; Clark and 
Oswald 1996; Judge et al. 2010; Nanda and Browne 1977). Austerity measures thus 
do appear to have damaging consequences for job attitudes. 
This, of course, does not mean that all is lost. At least in 2010, public employees in all 
European countries were still on average more satisfied than dissatisfied with their 
jobs. Similarly, work motivation scores were on average above the mean of the scale 
in public sectors of all European countries. Our results, however, do shed doubt on the 
extent to which governments can turn ‘doing more with less’ mantras into practice. 
Public employees are central agents to achieve more with less – yet austerity-induced 
pay cuts and work demands decrease both their job satisfaction and work motivation. 
Doing less with less may thus well be a more accurate description of organizational 
behavior after the Great Recession. 
23 
Second, the study exploited the empirical setting offered by the Great Recession – 
with austerity measures implemented across a range of countries – to conduct a large-
scale test of prior theories of job satisfaction and work motivation. In doing so, it 
added, most notably, to existing studies which argued for the fundamental importance 
of value alignment for public sector organizations (Brown 1976; Grant 2008; 
Paarlberg and Perry 2007; Wright 2007). The study suggests that value alignment not 
only enhances work motivation and job satisfaction as prior studies had noted. It, 
additionally, shields the work motivation of public employees when public 
organizations undertake cutbacks. This underscores the central, beneficial role of 
value alignment in times of organizational decline. At the same time, it points to a 
lifeline for public managers pursuing the Holy Grail of ‘more with less’: safeguard 
employee work motivation by ensuring their values are aligned with those of the 
organization and their jobs. 
This conclusion also underscores the utility of further research on austerity and public 
sector workforces. Doing more with less is a central challenge for post-Great 
Recession public sectors, with a panoply of U.S. state and local governments, post-
Brexit Britain and Greece, among many, facing continued pressure to impose fiscal 
cuts. Public employees play a crucial role in overcoming this ‘doing more with less’ 
challenge. Yet, research on how the Great Recession has affected public employees, 
and what public sector organizations can do to retain and motivate public employees 
in austerity contexts remains scarce. Our analysis sheds light on these questions. It 
does have some limitations. To begin with, it covers only European countries, not 
austerity in other regions and countries. Future studies would do well to expand the 
geographic scope of inquiry. Moreover, the paper assesses the effect of austerity on 
only two attitudes of public servants, work motivation and job satisfaction. Austerity 
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may well be expected to affect a range of other work-related attitudes and behaviors. 
Future studies could explore our arguments further by distinguishing, for example, the 
effects of pay cuts and long working hours on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. It 
would be of great interest to see if cutbacks deteriorate the prosocial motivation of 
public service employees. Another interesting venue for future research is to develop 
a more complete assessment of value alignment among an individual’s values and 
those of the organization where he or she works – for instance by assessing which 
values matter in terms of alignment –  to understand in more depth how value 
alignment relates to motivation and job satisfaction. 
A second limitation is that the data represent only public employees who remained in 
the public sector after the onset of the Great Recession. Panel data would be required 
to also study those who left – who, likely, saw the greatest decline in satisfaction and 
motivation. Much fertile empirical ground to study the relationship between austerity 
and organizational behavior and attitudes in the public sector thus remains. 
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Notes 
1 Due to item non-response, the full models of the regression analyses in Tables 2 and 
3 only include responses from 3,199 of the 9,761 public employee respondents. 82 
percent of the decrease in observations from the full public employee sample to those 
included in the regression is due to non-response to four variables: work pressure, 
organizational involvement, income and working conditions. To assess potential non-
response bias, we tested whether survey respondents who did not respond to these items 
differed in our other explanatory variables from those who did. We found no 
statistically significant differences between the two groups in terms of gender and 
education, thus providing some suggestive evidence that item non-response does not 
bias our results. 
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Table 1. Binary correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Job satisfaction                 
2. Motivation .383*                
3. Gender .015 .043*               
4. Age -.037* -.030* .022*              
5. Education .067* .051* .079* -.111*             
6. Income -.007 .039* .010 .050* .065*            
7. Size of 
workplace 
-.024* -.044* -.055* -.015 .094* .043*           
8. Tenure -.040* -.011 -.022* .584* -.038* -.001 .081*          
9. Working hours -.088* -.041* -.150* .015 -.028* .078* .039* .062*         
10. Work pressure -.101* -.030* .039* -.027* -.039* -.001 .086* -.005 .071*        
11. Autonomy .127* .096* .091* .049* .190* .061* -.040* .017 -.063* -.117*       
12. Org. 
involvement 
.203* .267* -.001 .009 .194* .041* -.026* .031* .006 .030* .241*      
13. Work well done .259* .302* .015 .017 -.010 -.000 -.061* .027* -.037* -.034* .076* .205*     
14. Useful work .198* .283* .042* .032* .060* .015 -.046* .051* -.025* .016 .108* .215* .577*    
15. Value 
alignment 
.115* .073* .007 .040* -.015 .020 -.016 .022* -.051* -.106* -.005 -.095* .128* .110*   
16. Change in 
Working conditions 
.143* .123* -.053* -.018 .020 .055* .054* -.001 -.098* -.041* .041* .016 .042* .038* .018  
17. Change in 
Working 
Conditions* Value 
alignment 
.015 .031* -.040* -.052* .026* .024 .047* -.031* -.040* .051* .033* .075* -.064* -.054* -.716* .661* 
Note: *p < .05 
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Table 2. Regression: Job satisfaction 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Gender -.034 (.022) -.028 (.024) -.026 (.024) 
Age -.002 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* 
Education .001 (.009) .006 (.009) .007 (.010) 
Income 4.70e-07 (9.44e-07) -1.24e-07 (9.61e-07) -1.45e-07 (9.59e-07) 
Size of workplace .006 (.006) .008 (.007) .008 (.007) 
Tenure -.001 (.001) 4.77e-05 (.001) -4.09e-05 (.001) 
Working hours -.002 (.001) -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* 
Work pressure -.048 (.007)*** -.042 (.007)*** -.042 (.007)*** 
Autonomy .039 (.010)*** .034 (.011)** .034 (.011)** 
Organizational involvement .100 (.011)*** .096 (.012)*** .096 (.012)*** 
Work well done .136 (.015)*** .135 (.016)*** .134 (.016)*** 
Useful work .062 (.015)*** .058 (.017)** .057 (.016)** 
Value alignment .064 (.009)*** .053 (.010)*** .112 (.039)** 
Change in working conditions  .118 (.016)*** .036 (.056) 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment   .020 (.013) 
Country Level Intercept 1.915 (.118)*** 2.340 (.140)*** 2.097 (.211)*** 
Log likelihood -3,699.032 -3,081.451 -3,080.269 
N 3,828 3,199 3,199 
Notes: Hierarchical linear model regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Table 3. Regression: Motivation  
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Gender .099 (.033)** .112 (.036)** .112 (.035)** 
Age -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) 
Education -.016 (.013) -.021 (.014) -.020 (.014) 
Income 2.14e-06 (1.29e-06) 2.09e-06 (1.23e-06) 2.05e-06 (1.23e-06) 
Size of workplace -.020 (.009)* -.017 (.010) -.017  (.010) 
Tenure -.004 (.002)* -.004 (.002) -.004 (.002) 
Working hours .002 (.002) .001 (.002) .001 (.002) 
Work pressure -.017 (.010) -.014 (.010) -.014 (.010) 
Autonomy .031 (.015)* .035 (.016)* .036 (.016)* 
Organizational involvement .212 (.016)*** .205 (.018)*** .205 (.018)*** 
Work well done .233 (.022)*** .251 (.024)*** .249 (.024)*** 
Useful work .169 (.023)*** .147 (.025)*** .147 (.025)*** 
Value alignment .049 (.014)*** .042 (.015)** .164 (.059)** 
Change in working conditions  .113 (.024)*** -.057 (.083) 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment   .042 (.019)* 
Country Level Intercept .989 (.172)*** 1.389 (.204)*** .885 (.311)** 
Log likelihood -5,163.675 -4,332.620 -4,330.332 
N 3,824 3,199 3,199 
Notes: Hierarchical linear model regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Appendix 
Variable Question Scale/Operationalization N Mean S.D Min-Max 
Dependent variables 
Job 
satisfaction 
On the whole, are you very satisfied, satisfied, not 
very satisfied or not at all satisfied with working 
conditions in your main paid job? 
1=Not at all satisfied 
2=Not very satisfied 
3=Satisfied 
4=Very satisfied 
9,665 3.043 .693 1-4 
Motivation 
The organization I work for motivates me to give my 
best job performance. 
1=Strongly disagree 
2=Disagree 
3=Neither agree nor disagree 
4=Agree 
5=Strongly agree 
9,541 3.609 1.049 1-5 
 
Control and Explanatory variables 
Country - 
1=Belgium 
2=Bulgaria 
3=Czech Republic 
4=Denmark 
5=Germany 
6=Estonia 
7=Greece 
8=Spain 
9=France 
10=Ireland 
11=Italy 
12=Cyprus 
13=Latvia 
14=Lithuania 
15=Luxembourg 
16=Hungary 
17=Malta 
18=Netherlands 
19=Austria 
20=Poland 
21=Portugal 
22=Romania 
23=Slovenia 
24=Slovakia 
25=Finland 
26=Sweden 
27=UK 
28=Croatia 
29=FYROM 
30=Turkey 
31=Norway 
32=Albania 
33=Kosovo 
34=Montenegro 
9,761 - - 1-34 
Gender - 
1=Male 
2=Female 
9,761 1.611 .487 1-2 
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Age - - 9,708 43.335 11.416 15-89 
Education 
What is the highest level of education or training that 
you have successfully completed? 
0=Pre-primary education 
1=Primary education 
2=Lower secondary education 
3=Upper secondary education 
5=Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
5=Tertiary education – first level 
6=Tertiary education – advanced level 
9,738 3.743 1.273 0-6 
Income 
Please can you tell us how much are your net 
monthly earnings from your main paid job? 
- 6,848 8,198.37 20,133.58 16.8- 480,000 
Size of 
workplace 
How many people in total work at your workplace (at 
the local site)? 
1=1 
2=2-4 
3=5-9 
4=10-49 
5=50-99 
6=100-249 
7=250-499 
8=500 and over 
9,359 4.510 1.706 1-8 
Tenure 
How many years have you been in your company or 
organization? 
- 9,623 12.160 10.451 0-57 
Working 
hours 
How many hours do you usually work per week in 
your main paid job? 
- 9,581 35.959 10.304 1-168 
Work 
pressure 
Does your job involve (1) working at a very high 
speed and (2) working to tight deadlines. 
1=Never 
2=Almost never 
3=Around ¼ of the time 
4=Around half of the time 
5=Around ¾ of the time 
6=Almost all the time 
7=All the time 
6,379 4.046 1.594 2-7 
Autonomy 
Are you able to choose or change (1) your order of 
tasks; (2) your methods of work; (3) your speed or 
rate of work? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
9,544 2.027 1.153 0-3 
Organization 
involvement 
(1) you are consulted before targets for your work are 
set; (2) you are involved in improving the work 
organization or work processes of your department or 
1=Never 
2=Rarely 
3=Sometimes 
4=Most of the times 
8,661 2.875 1.073 1-5 
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organization; (3) you have a say in the choice of your 
working partners 
5=Always  
Work well 
done 
Your job gives you the feeling of work well done  
1=Never 
2=Rarely 
3=Sometimes 
4=Most of the time 
5=Always 
9,683 4.266 .851 1-5 
Useful work You have the feeling of doing useful work  
1=Never 
2=Rarely 
3=Sometimes 
4=Most of the time 
5=Always 
9,703 4.463 .797 1-5 
Value 
alignment 
Your job involves tasks that are in conflict with your 
personal values  
1=Always 
2=Most of the time 
3=Sometimes 
4=Rarely 
5=Never 
9,571 4.205 1.131 1-5 
Working 
conditions 
[Taking into account the changes in the number of 
hours you work per week and your salary since 2009, 
your current working conditions are] 
1=Worse in working hours and salary 
2=Worse in working hours or salary 
3=Equal 
4=Better in working hours or salary 
5=Better in working hours and salary 
8,161 2.926 .741 1-5 
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Table A1. Regression for Job Satisfaction & Motivation – Eastern Europe 
Predictor DV: Job satisfaction DV: Motivation 
Gender -.023 (.024) -.025 (.024) .118 (.036)** .119 (.036)** 
Age -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) 
Education .006 (.001) .006 (.010) -.022 (.014) -.023 (.014) 
Income .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Size of workplace .008 (.007) .008 (.007) -.018 (.011) -.017 (.011) 
Tenure .000 (.001) .000 (.001) -.004 (.002)* -.004 (.002)* 
Working hours -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* .001 (.002) .001 (.002) 
Work pressure -.042 (.007)*** -.042 (.007)*** -.014 (.011) -.014 (.011) 
Autonomy .034 (.011)** .034 (.011)** .035 (.016)* .035 (.016)* 
Organizational involvement .096 (.012)*** .096 (.012)*** .205 (.018)*** .205 (.018)*** 
Work well done .133 (.016)*** .134 (.016)*** .249 (.024)*** .250 (.024)*** 
Useful work .057 (.017)** .057 (.017)** .147 (.025)*** .147 (.025)*** 
Value alignment .111 (.040)** .108 (.039)** .161 (.059)** .155 (.059)** 
Change in working conditions  .031 (.056) .042 (.056) -.064 (.084) -.052 (.083) 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment .020 (.013) .017 (.013) .041 (.019)* .035 (.020) 
Eastern countries .043 (.169) .033 (.121) .196 (.240) .209 (.168) 
Change in working conditions * Eastern countries .047 (.051) - .089 (.074) - 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment * 
Eastern countries  .010 (.008) - .022 (.011) 
Country Level Intercept 2.097 (.212)*** 2.109 (.211)*** .887 (.311)** .892 (.311)** 
Log likelihood -3,078.985 -3,078.405 -4,329.579 -4,328.098 
N 3,199 3,199 3,199 3,199 
Notes: Hierarchical linear model regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p ≤ .05 
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Table A2. Regression for Job Satisfaction & Motivation – Northern Europe 
Predictor DV: Job satisfaction DV: Motivation 
Gender -.027 (.024) -.029 (.024) .111 (.036)** .110 (.036)** 
Age -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) 
Education .006 (.010) .006 (.010) -.022 (.014) -.023 (.014) 
Income .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Size of workplace .008 (.007) .008 (.007) -.018 (.010) -.017 (.010) 
Tenure .000 (.001) .000 (.001) -.004 (.002) -.004 (.002) 
Working hours -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* .001 (.002) .001 (.002) 
Work pressure -.042 (.007)*** -.041 (.007)*** -.014 (.011) -.014 (.011) 
Autonomy .033 (.011)** .033 (.011)** .032 (.016)* .033 (.016)* 
Organizational involvement .094 (.012)*** .094 (.012)*** .203 (.018)*** .203 (.018)*** 
Work well done .136 (.016)*** .136 (.016)*** .253 (.024)*** .254 (.024)*** 
Useful work .057 (.017)** .056 (.017)** .147 (.025)*** .147 (.025)*** 
Value alignment .110 (.039)** .112 (.039)** .162 (.058)** .163 (.059)** 
Change in working conditions  .069 (.058) .040 (.056) -.025 (.087) -.048 (.083) 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment .020 (.013) .022 (.013) .041 (.019)* .045 (.019)* 
Northern countries -.026 (.109) .102 (.083) -.034 (.152) .024 (.113) 
Change in working conditions * Northern countries -.063 (.032)* - -.058 (.047) - 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment * 
Northern countries - -.004 (.005) - 
-.009 (.008) 
Country Level Intercept 2.158 (.216)*** 2.093 (.213)*** .951 (.319)** .917 (.313)** 
Log likelihood -3,074.0965 -3,075.563 -4,327.287 -4,327.320 
N 3,199 3,199 3,199 3,199 
Notes: Hierarchical linear model regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p ≤ .05 
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Table A3. Regression for Job Satisfaction & Motivation – Southern Europe 
Predictor DV: Job satisfaction DV: Motivation 
Gender -.029 (.024) -.029 (.024) .112 (.036)** .110 (.036)** 
Age -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) 
Education .007 (.010) .007 (.010) -.021 (.014) -.021 (.014) 
Income .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Size of workplace .007 (.007) .008 (.007) -.018 (.011) -.018 (.011) 
Tenure .000 (.001) .000 (.001) -.004 (.002) -.004 (.002) 
Working hours -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* .001 (.002) .001 (.002) 
Work pressure -.042 (.007)*** -.041 (.007)*** -.014 (.011) -.013 (.011) 
Autonomy .033 (.011)** .033 (.011)** .034 (.016)* .034 (.016)* 
Organizational involvement .095 (.012)*** .095 (.012)*** .205 (.018)*** .205 (.018)*** 
Work well done .136 (.016)*** .136 (.016)*** .251 (.024)*** .251 (.024)*** 
Useful work .058 (.017)** .058 (.017)** .148 (.025)*** .148 (.025)*** 
Value alignment .111 (.039)** .112 (.039)** .163 (.059)** .164 (.059)** 
Change in working conditions  .017 (.057) .038 (.056) -.064 (.085) -.055 (.083) 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment .020 (.013) .019 (.013) .042 (.019)* .040 (.020)* 
Southern countries .076 (.113) -.077 (.082) .007 (.160) -.130 (.113) 
Change in working conditions * Southern countries 0.67 (.034)* - .025 (.050) - 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment * 
Southern countries - .004 (.005) - 
.004 (.008) 
Country Level Intercept 2.094 (.214)*** 2.137 (.213)*** .897 (.316)** .898 (.315)** 
Log likelihood -3,075.916 -3,077.567 -4,329.627 -4,329.585 
N 3,199 3,199 3,199 3,199 
Notes: Hierarchical linear model regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p ≤ .05 
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Table A4. Regression for Job Satisfaction & Motivation – Western Europe 
Predictor DV: Job satisfaction DV: Motivation 
Gender -.027 (.024) -.027 (.024) .115 (.036)** .117 (.036)** 
Age -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) 
Education .006 (.010) .006 (.010) -.021 (.014) -.021 (.014) 
Income .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Size of workplace .008 (.007) .007 (.007) -.017 (.011) -.017 (.010) 
Tenure .000 (.001) .000 (.001) -.004 (.002) -.004 (.002) 
Working hours -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* .001 (.002) .001 (.002) 
Work pressure -.042 (.007)*** -.041 (.007)*** -.014 (.011) -.014 (.011) 
Autonomy .034 (.011)** .034 (.011)** .035 (.016)* .035 (.016)* 
Organizational involvement .096 (.012)*** .096 (.012)*** .204 (.018)*** .204 (.018)*** 
Work well done .134 (.016)*** .134 (.016)*** .250 (.023)*** .250 (.024)*** 
Useful work .057 (.017)** .057 (.017)** .148 (.025)*** .147 (.025)*** 
Value alignment .112 (.039)** .111 (.039)** .163 (.058)** .161 (.059)** 
Change in working conditions  039 (.056) .037 (.056) -.058 (.083) -.055 (.083) 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment .020 (.013) .021 (.013) .042 (.019)* .042 (.019)* 
Western countries -.035 (.175) -.034 (.126) -.001 (.247) -.182 (.168) 
Change in working conditions * Western countries -.038 (.054) - .012 (.079) - 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment * 
Western countries - -.009 (.008) - 
-.013 (.012) 
Country Level Intercept 2.095 (.212)*** 2.099 (.212)*** .889 (.313)** .916 (.312)** 
Log likelihood -3,079.664 -3,079.237 -4,330.249 -4,329.709 
N 3,199 3,199 3,199 3,199 
Notes: Hierarchical linear model regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p ≤ .05 
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Online Appendix 
Table A5. Regression for Job Satisfaction & Motivation with the interaction effect of Autonomy 
Predictor Job satisfaction Motivation 
Gender -.026 (.024) -.026 (.024) .112 (.036)** .116 (.036)** 
Age -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* -.001 (.002) -.001 (.002) 
Education .007 (.010) .007 (.010) -.021 (.014) -.021 (.014) 
Income .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
Size of workplace .008 (.007) .008 (.007) -.017 (.011) -.017 (.011) 
Tenure -.000 (.001) -.000 (.001) -.004 (.002) -.004 (.002) 
Working hours -.003 (.001)* -.003 (.001)* .001 (.002) .001 (.002) 
Work pressure -.042 (.007)*** -.042 (.007)*** -.014 (.011) -.014 (.011) 
Autonomy -.055 (.041) -.055 (.041) .024 (.061) .024 (.061) 
Organizational involvement -.095 (.012)*** -.095 (.012)*** .205 (.018)*** .205 (.018)*** 
Work well done .135 (.016)*** .135 (.016)*** .250 (.024)*** .250 (.024)*** 
Useful work .057 (.017)** .057 (.017)** .147 (.025)*** .147 (.025)*** 
Value alignment .110 (.040)** .110 (.040)** .042 (.015)** .164 (.060)** 
Change in working conditions .020 (.063) .101 (.063) .123 (.049)* -.048 (.094)* 
Change in working conditions * Autonomy -.0.30(.013)* -.0.30 (.013)* -.005 (.020) -.005 (.020) 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment   .020 (.013)  .041 (.019)* 
Country Level Intercept 2.288 (.227)*** 2.288 (.227)*** 1.416 (.239)*** .910 (.336)** 
Log likelihood -3,077.737 -3,077.736 -4,332.594 -4,330.311 
N 3,199 3,199 3,199 3,199 
Notes: Hierarchical linear model regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Table A6. Regression for Job Satisfaction & Motivation with the interaction effect of Job security 
Predictor Job satisfaction Motivation 
Gender -.045 -.043 0.115** .119** 
Age -.003* -.003* -0.001 -.001 
Education .001 .001 -0.029* -.029 
Income .000 .000 0.000 .000** 
Size of workplace .001 .001 -0.017 -.018 
Tenure -.001 -.001 -0.005* -.005* 
Working hours -.004** -.004** 0.001 .001 
Work pressure -.035*** -.035*** -0.009* -.010 
Autonomy .036** .036** 0.036 .036* 
Job security -.052 -.050 -0.050 -.045 
Organizational involvement .089*** .089*** 0.201*** .200*** 
Work well done .130*** .129*** 0.242*** .241*** 
Useful work .044** .044** 0.138*** .138*** 
Value alignment .052*** .103* 0.051** .176** 
Change in working conditions .103** .017 0.113* -.066 
Change in working conditions * Job security .002 .029 -0.005 -.003 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment   .003  .043* 
Country Level Intercept 2.625*** 2.409*** 1.539*** 1.011*** 
Log likelihood -2,887.059 -2,886.196 -4,133.539 -4,131.267 
N 3,053 3,053 3,057 3,057 
Notes: Hierarchical linear model regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Table A7. Regression for Job Satisfaction & Motivation with 2009-2010 country changes in per capita incomes 
Predictor Job satisfaction Motivation 
Gender -.026 (.024) 0.117 (.036)** 
Age -.003 (.001)* -0.001 (.002) 
Education .007 (.010) -0.021 (.014) 
Income .000 (.000) 0.000 (.000) 
Size of workplace .008 (.007) -0.017 (.011) 
Tenure .000 (.001) -0.004 (.002) 
Working hours -.003 (.001)* 0.001 (.002) 
Work pressure -.042 (.007)*** -0.014 (.011) 
Autonomy .034 (.011)** 0.036 (.016)* 
Organizational involvement .096 (.012)*** 0.205 (.018)*** 
Work well done .134 (.016)*** 0.250 (.024)*** 
Useful work .058 (.017)** 0.148 (.025)*** 
Value alignment .112 (.040)** 0.165 (.059)** 
Change in working conditions .036 (.056) -0.059 (.083) 
Change in working conditions * Value alignment .020 (.013) 0.042 (.019)* 
2009-2010 changes in per capita incomes .000 (.011) 0.007 (.018) 
Country Level Intercept 2.097 (.213)*** 0.862 (.013)** 
Log likelihood -3,080.270 -4,330.332 
N 3,199 3,199 
Notes: Hierarchical linear model regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
 
 
